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LIENS - SEEN THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY
RAY D. HENSON*
The pertinent facts in the recent case of Hertzberg v. Associates
Discount Corporation)
 were these: On June 26, 1957 Freedman
purchased a Chevrolet truck and executed a chattel mortgage on the
truck to the seller. The mortgagee's interest was assigned to Associates
Discount Corporation. The mortgage was properly recorded in Wayne
County, Michigan on July 5, 1957, nine days after its execution.
Freedman filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy on January 2,
1958, and was adjudicated a bankrupt on that date. The bankrupt
had possession of the truck from the time it was purchased until it
was repossessed by Associates Discount at approximately the date
of bankruptcy.
A Michigan statute provided: 2
Every mortgage ... of goods and chattels ... which shall not
be accompanied by an immediate delivery and followed by
an actual and continued change of possession of the things
mortgaged, shall be absolutely void as against creditors of
the mortgagor, and as against subsequent purchasers or
mortgagees in good faith, unless the mortgage or a true copy
thereof shall be filed .. . : Provided, however, That any such
mortgage shall not be void in the case of insolvency pro-
ceedings as against the creditors of the mortgagor if filed
within 14 days from the date thereof; . .
The receiver (afterwards trustee) petitioned for an order that
Associates Discount show cause why its lien should not be declared
null and void under Section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, which
provides in part: 3
. The trustee, as to all property, ... upon which a creditor
of the bankrupt could have obtained a lien by legal or
equitable proceedings at the date of bankruptcy, shall be
deemed vested as of such date with all the rights, remedies,
and powers of a creditor then holding a lien thereon by such
proceedings, whether or not such a creditor actually exists.
* B.S.L. 1947, LL.B. 1949, University of Illinois; Editor, Landmarks of Law
(1960). Counsel, Continental Assurance Company, Chicago,
1 272 F.2d 6 (6th Cir. 1959), affirming In re Freedman, 168 F. Supp. 25 (ED.
Mich, 1958).
2 Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.140 (Supp. 1956). Compare UCC § 9-301(2).
3 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1952).
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In this instance the secured creditor won. The court concluded
that the powers of the trustee as a hypothetical creditor were to be
determined by state law, that the Bankruptcy Act did not limit the
extent to which the state might curtail these powers, and that the
state statute did not strip the trustee of any powers, since the trustee
had never acquired the power to invalidate the lien.
This result should not alarm lawyers in general, and it should
not disappoint anyone in particular except, possibly, referees and
trustees in bankruptcy.
The referee in this instance had held that the trustee could
avoid Associates Discount's lien on the authority of Constance v.
Harvey,' for if the trustee had all of the rights of the most perfect
possible hypothetical creditor under state law, the state could not,
by the technique employed here, take any of those rights away with-
out conflicting with Bankruptcy Act, and such a conflict would avoid
the state lien. 5
 Until the proviso was inserted in the state statute quoted
above, a mortgage had to be recorded immediately after execution
or else it was void as to those extending credit between execution
and recordation, and the intended effect of the proviso was to prevent
avoidance of the lien in insolvency proceedings, including bankruptcy,
if it were recorded within fourteen days of its execution"
The perfection of .a security interest by "relation back" is not
an unusual doctrine, and in the case of the Michigan statute involved
here, an instance of "relation back" is evident whether the recording
4 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. '1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955). In this case
on November 25, 1949, copies of a purchase money chattel mortgage were sent by the
seller's attorney to Albany and to Watervliet for filing. The mortgage was filed in
Albany but through an error it was returned unfiled by the Town Clerk in Watervliet.
Under the state statute, the mortgage had to be filed in Watervliet, and this was ac-
complished in October 5, 1950. The buyer was adjudicated a bankrupt on October 23,
1951. Under New York law late filing was good against creditors becoming such after
the filing. Since Section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act gave the trustee the status
of a lien creditor as to any property on which a hypothetical creditor could have ob-
tained a lien at the date of bankruptcy, the court at first thought it was necessary to
determine when the petition in bankruptcy was filed. In denying a petition for re-
hearing the court sua sponte corrected its view of New York law and decided that it
was not necessary that the petition in bankruptcy be filed before the mortgage was
filed for the trustee to prevail, Under New York law an unfiled chattel mortgage was
void as to a simple contract creditor becoming such, without notice, prior to the filing
of the mortgage, so that it was possible for a creditor to obtain a lien at the time the
petition in bankruptcy was filed, and the trustee was entitled to be put in the position
of an "ideal" hypothetical creditor.
5 In re Freedman, 168 F. Supp. 25, 27 (E.D. Mich. 1958). The referee was on fairly
firm ground, it would appear, if it were necessary for him to attempt to follow the
strained construction of the Bankruptcy Act adopted sua sponte by the Second Circuit
in Constance v. Harvey.
6 Ibid.
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is "immediate" or within fourteen days. That is, if a purchase money
security interest, such as this one, is in dispute, the usual assumption
will be that it attached at the moment the purchaser acquired the
chattel or his "rights" in it, and there is bound to be some interval
between the "creation" of the security interest and the recording of the
instrument which gives public notice of its existence.? When an
extension of credit makes an acquisition possible, it is anomalous to
deprive the "secured" creditor of his security for the undeserved
benefit of a class of creditors who probably have not—except in some-
one's imagination—extended credit relying on the debtor's ownership
of a specific chattel. Unless a sensible and practical reading is given
to state statutes creating liens and to the Bankruptcy Act, all creditors
will become unsecured creditors in bankruptcy. This may be a con-
stitutionally permissible result, but it seems an unnecessary inter-
ference with business expectations.
In this age of credit financing, the greater the calculated risk,
the higher the interest rate will be, if credit is extended at all. Surely
Michigan, of all states, should be interested in protecting secured
financers of motor vehicles and in creating a climate conducive to the
purchase of automobiles as cheaply and as rapidly as possible in the
light of the prime importance of automobile manufacturing to Mich-
igan's economy and the fact that a majority of automobile sales can-
not be consummated as cash transactions.
The nature of liens (and priorities) has received considerable
judicial explication within recent years, and the problem is far from
solved. It is worthy of more exploration, and a passage from the
world's most readable book on logic furnishes a point of departure.
The White Knight has told Alice that he will sing a song to comfort
her, and "The name of the song is called 'Haddocks' Eyes'."
"Oh, that's the name of the song, is it?" Alice said,
trying to feel interested.
"No, you don't understand," the Knight said, looking
7 Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a security interest attaches when (1) there
is an agreement that it attach, (2) value is given, and (3) the debtor has "rights" in
the collateral (§ 9-204), and it is perfected by filing a financing statement, unless filing
is excused (§ 9-302(1)), as it may be when the secured party takes and retains possession
of the collateral (§ 9-305) or in the case of purchase money security interest in "con-
sumer goods" other than fixtures and motor vehicles (§ 9-302(1)(d)), subject, how-
ever, to certain buyers taking free of the security interest unless it is recorded (§ 9-307
(2)), and motor vehicles may be exempt from the Code's filing provisions (§ 9-302(3)).
On Code security interests under the Bankruptcy Act, see Coogan, The Impact of Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Corporate Indenture, 69 Yale L.J. 203, 241-
49 (1959); Comment, The Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act: Potential Con-
flicts, 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 411 (1958).
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a little vexed. "That's what the name is called. The name
really is 'The Aged, Aged, Man'."
"Then I ought to have said, 'That's what the song is
called'?" Alice corrected herself.
- "No, you oughtn't: that's quite another thing! The song
is called 'Ways and Means': but that's only what it's called,
you know!"
"Well, what is the song, then?" said Alice, who was by
this time completely bewildered.
"I was coming to that," the Knight said. "The song
really is 'A-sitting On A Gate': and the tune's my own
invention."'
The problem of proper names appears to be one of the most
difficult problems in logic, at least to some logicians, 9 and this paper
will offer no contribution towards a solution. But to apply Lewis
Carroll's dialogue to a familiar situation, suppose we have in mind
a particular geographical area in Italy. We in the United States may
call the name of this area "Rome", but the name, in Italy, is "Roma".
The area may be called "The Eternal City", and it is what it is: the
congeries of people, places, things that we choose to refer to in the
particular circumstances."
To come home to our problem here, Professor MacLachlan has
differentiated liens and priorities in this way: "A true lien is a
property right existing and entitled to recognition as soon as it is
created by contract, by conveyance, by legal process, or otherwise.
A mere direction of the order of distribution in cases of insolvency or
liquidation is only a priority in substance.""
It would appear that the major distinction between liens and
priorities is to be drawn on the basis of when the differentiation
becomes important. Neither a lien nor' a priority will be said to
exist unless money is owed, and it will not matter how we describe
8 Carroll, Alice's Adventure in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass 281
(Modern Library ed.).
9 See e.g., Russell, Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits 72-84 (1948); Russell,
My Philosophical Development 156-174 (1959); Quine, From a Logical Point of View,
passim (1953).
10 This analysis was suggested by R. W. Holmes, The Philosopher's Alice in Wonder-
land, 19 Antioch Review 133 (1959).
11 MacLachlan, Improving the Law of Federal Liens and Priorities, 1 B.C. Ind.
& Corn. L.R. 73, 76 (1959). When using the label "property right", it is well to recall
the words of Mr. Justice Holmes in Du Pont v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917):
"The word 'property' as applied to trade marks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed ex-
pression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some
rudimentary requirements of good faith."
88
LIENS—SEEN THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY
the creditor's interest unless the debtor is involved in some kind of
financial difficulty and cannot or will not pay the debt. Unless a
debtor has "property" of some description, no debt can be paid,
and when we are dealing in fact situations where either "lien" or
"priority" may customarily be applied, the creditor clearly has some
kind of "interest" in the debtor's property.
It would seem to be satisfactory to use the term "priority"
to apply to a creditor's interest in a distribution of a debtor's assets
on insolvency, as Professor MacLachlan suggests, when that creditor
has had no particular interest in a specific asset at an earlier time.
This usage leaves us with "lien" to apply to interests in specific assets
which arose before insolvency and which are normally enforceable
without regard to insolvency.
Whichever term we use is chosen because we have analyzed a
set of facts and decided that such usage is proper." There is nothing
inexorable about the use of these words; others would do as well.
The use of either "Iien" or "priority" simply is a short-hand expression
for saying that, in the analyst's opinion, the existence of a given set
of facts will, if the proper motions are gone through, lead to a
particular legal result.' 3
The set of facts in our legal problem is equivalent to what
the "song really is" or to our geographical area. From these facts
we draw a legal conclusion that a "money claim" exists, and this
is what our song is called; it is our "Eternal City". The name of
this claim may be, in our case, a lien, as in the name of the song or
"Roma". We may call this name something else that conforms to
our purposes, as "Rome" is preferred by some to "Roma", and if
we are talking of something named "lien", we may sometimes call
it a mortgage." We may call it by a double name, such as tax lien,
12 Bertrand Russell has observed that a child acquires the habit of using the word
"dog" on appropriate occasions in the same way that other habits are acquired. He
hears others use the word "dog" when a particular animal is present and presently be
has the impulse to say "dog" at the appropriate time, or when he hears the word, he
looks for the animal. With the acquisition of these two habits the child knows the
meaning of "dog", he can use the word correctly, and he need know no more on the
subject unless he becomes a lexicographer. Russell, My Philosophical Development 146
(1959). Russell limits this analysis of "meaning" to what he calls "object-words", of
which the law has few or none, but this analysis is, nonetheless, helpful.
13 I think this is a fair extension of Mr. Justice Holmes' comment that ". . . a
legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain
things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court; and so
of a legal right." Holmes, "The Path of the Law" in Collected Legal Papers 167, 169
(1920). See also Ross, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 812 (1957).
14 Admittedly liens and songs are not quite comparable, so this analogy is not
completely satisfactory, but even Lewis Carroll was inconsistent in saying, "The song
really is 'A-sitting On A Gate', because what the song really was, could only have been
told by singing it.
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mechanic's lien, or landlord's lien. We may say it is prior or subsequent,
superior or inferior, general or specific, and recently it has become
quite important to "know" whether it can be correctly called choate
or inchoate.
It is tautological, and therefore true, to say, "A lien is a lien;' " 5
but it is not helpful. Nevertheless, it has become a question of signifi-
cance to ask, "When is a lien a lien?" (Obviously "lien" is used here
in two different senses.) Within recent years a great many state-
created "liens" have been held to be inchoate and not perfected, so
that the federal priority or federal revenue lien has come ahead of
them. This series of cases has created great consternation at the bar,
and doubtless a great many expectations have been disappointed."
But the results here—as contrasted with the liens-in-bankruptcy cases
—are intellectually defensible, if we analyze the nature of liens; and
if we insist that an interest may be treated as a lien when it is not
so-called, then we must surely concede that the mere use of the
label does not foreclose an investigation into the nature of the product.
The proper way to change the result in federal versus state lien
contests is through legislation,'' not through continual (and by now
probably useless) criticism of the Supreme Court. The Court has
wrestled with a very basic and significant set of problems: What is a
lien? When is a lien? How is a lien created? Is there a period of
gestation or does it emerge full-grown, as from Medusa's headless
body? These problems are not simple, and they are worthy of more
serious analytical thought than they have received. Liens are purely
mental conceptions, and the difference between, for example, a
coventional mortgage lien and the so-called floating lien of the Uniform
Commercial Code is only one of degree, not kind.
If someone asks what a pencil is, the simplest and best way
to answer the question is to hold up a pencil.' If someone asks what
16 Such, at least, is the traditional, Iaw-of-identity, Aristotelian learning. It was
once subscribed to by Robert M. Hutchins; Sondel, The Humanity of Words 94 (1958).
But in the non-Aristotelian view of general semantics, as in the non-verbal world of
experience, tautologies have limited validity ; that is, lien 1 is not lien 2, a lien (federal
tax) is not a lien (mortgage), a mortgage lien is not a mechanic's lien, etc. See John-
son, People in Quandaries 7-10, 178-83, passim (1946).
16 The articles on this subject are multitudinous. In general, see Kennedy, The
Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and
General Lien, 63 Yale L.J. 905 (1954) ; MacLachlan, Improving the Law of Federal
Liens and Priorities, 1 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L.R. 73 (1959) ; Panel Discussion, Dangers
Under Recent Federal Tax Lien Decisions, 14 Bus. Law. 12 (1958).
11 Such legislation has, of course, been proposed. See Proceedings, Section of Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law, American Bar Association, Part II, p. 89 (1957) ;
Id., p. 78 (1958) ; Id., p. 56 (1959) ; MacLachlan, supra note 16, at 82.
18 This is a favorite example of Korzybski, and, as he points out, the proper answer
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a lien is, we cannot hold one up on exhibition. A lien—or priority—
is not a physical Ming. It is the name for a legal conclusion which we
normally draw from certain assumed facts. The correctness of our
conclusion will occasionally be tested in court, and the final answer
given by a court is, for us, "law" whether we agree with it or not. In
any case we can never point to any thing and call it a lien. It is a
great problem in law—and it is a basis of distinction between law and
the natural sciences—that we can never apply the same name to two
exactly similar situations. There must be differences, and frequently
they are not negligible, although for purposes of stare decisis we
emphasize the similarities and minimize or ignore the differences.
This problem is not confined to law, of course." It would not be possible
to carry on our normal business if we did not have the faculty of
ignoring differences. We meaningfully use such words as "cow" by
concentrating on the similarities we have observed, usually in the
female members of the genus Bos, and ignoring individual variations.
It is helpful to have one word to describe, individually or collectively,
Bossie 1, Bossie 2, Bossie 3, etc.
As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has pointed out," Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes explored the nature of meaning long before Ogden
and Richards published their epochal work on The Meaning of Mean-
ing, and these words of Mr. Justice Holmes ought always to be
remembered : 51
We must think things not words, or at least we must con-
stantly translate our words into the facts for which they
stand, if we are to keep to the real and the true. I some-
times tell students that the law schools pursue an inspirational
combined with a logical method, that is, the postulates are
taken for granted upon authority without inquiry into their
worth, and then logic is used as the only tool to develop
the results. It is a necessary method for the purpose of teach-
ing dogma. But inasmuch as the real justification of a rule of
law, if there be one, is that it helps to bring about a social
end which we desire, it is no less necessary that those who
to the question is non-linguistic. It is not accurate to say, "This is a pencil." The
object we are talking about is not verbal. Korzybski, Science and Sanity 35 passim
(4th. ed., 1958).
19 See, e.g., Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning 209 et seq. (1956 ed.).
See also Cairns, "Language of Jurisprudence" in Language: An Enquiry Into its Mean-
ing and Function 232 (Anshen ed. 1957); Probert, Law and Persuasion: The Language-
Behavior of Lawyers, 108 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 35 (1959).
29 Frankfurter, "Mr. Justice Holmes" in Of Law and Men 158, 167 (1956).
21 Holmes, "Law in Science and Science in Law" in Collected Legal Papers 210,
238-39 (1920).
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make and develop the law should have those ends articulately
in their minds.
The Michigan recording statute involved in Hertzberg may, in
fact, conflict with the Bankruptcy Act in some circumstances, but
the result in that case was proper. 22 There have been enough mutations
in the progeny of Constance v. Harvey, and there was no need for the
Sixth Circuit to follow a Second Circuit decision which could well
be restricted, as a precedent, to late mortgage filings in Watervliet.
22 MacLachlan, Two Wrongs Make a Right, 37 Tex. L. Rev. 676 (1959).
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